Recapitalizing banking systems : implications for incentives and fiscal and monetary policy by Honohan, Patrick
w ps  a5qb
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2540
Recapitalizing  Banking  After a banking  crisis, when
authorities have decided to
System s  use budgetary funds to help
restructure  a large failed bank
Implications  for  Incentives  or banking  system,  apparent Implications for Incentives
conflicts between various
and Fiscal and Monetary Policy  goals (involving incentives  for
the  new bank management,
Patrick Honohan  for the government's  budget,
and for monetary stability)
can be resolved  by suitably
designing financial
instruments  and appropriately
allocating responsibility





















































































































dI  POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2540
Summary findings
In the aftermath  of a banking crisis, most attention  is  will typically entail new financial instruments involving
rightly focused on allocating losses, rebuilding properly  the government on both the asset and the liability sides
managed institutions, and achieving debt recovery. But  of the bank's balance sheet. The bank should not be left
the authorities'  decision to use budgetary funds to help  with mismatches of maturity, currency, or repricing.
restructure a large failed bank or banking system also has  Assets that are injected should be bankable and
consequences for the incentive structure for the new  preferably negotiable. The liability structure should give
bank management, for the government's budget, and for  bank insiders the incentive to manage the bank
monetary stability. These issues tend to be lumped  prudently.
together,  but each should  be dealt with in a distinctive  Financial  instruments  can be complex  and
manner.  sophisticated but only if the government has the
Honohan points out, among other things, how  credibility to warrant market confidence that it will
apparent  conflicts between the goals in each of these  deliver on the contracts rather than trying to use its
areas can be resolved by suitably designing financial  lawmaking powers to renege. Innovative use of
instruments and appropriately  allocating responsibility  segregating sinking funds and "Brady"-type bonds can
between different arms of government.  help where government credibility is weak.
First the government must have a coherent  medium-  Restructuring the bank will alter the size, maturity, and
term fiscal strategy that determines broadly how the  other characteristics of the government's debt. These
costs of the crisis will be absorbed. Then the failed bank  characteristics should be optimized separately and with
must be securely reestablished with enough capital and  the market as a whole, not just the affected banks.
franchise value to move forward as a normal bank. This
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ii1.  Introduction and Summary
The problem
This paper is concerned with one aspect of the resolution of banking crises, namely the
design of the financial instruments which may be used by the authorities  in recapitalizing
banks.
Of course, this is just one of the issues facing the authorities. When they realize that they
have a crisis of bank insolvency  on their hands, policy decisions and actions are required
in several different dimensions. The authorities  will have to intervene  in the management
of failed banks to stop any further erosion of net asset value. Incompetent or corrupt
management will have to be replaced. Arrangements  need to be put in place for recovery
of as much as possible of the nonperforming  bank assets. And the allocation of the net
losses as between the various claimants of the bank will have to be decided upon,
together with the implications of that for the government and ultimately for the taxpayer.
If a failed bank is simply to be liquidated,  then that process can take its course without
further specific official action. But often the government  will have decided to keep much
of the failed bank's activities going, honoring more of the depositors claims than can be
met from the remaining value of the bank's assets. For a while, this may be done while
keeping the bank under official nationalized  control, and while that is the case it is
probably  too soon to be thinking in terms of recapitalization. Eventually, though, the
authorities  will generally want to return the bank to normal autonomous  functioning
under private ownership. This may be done by a financial restructuring of each failed
bank, or by merging the continuing business  into a healthy bank.  In either case there will
have to be an additional transfer  of value from official sources. In other words, bank
recapitalizations  often involve an official injection  of resources into failed institutions.
But in what form should the funds be provided?  The purpose of this paper is to consider
how to design this transfer or value, this recapitalization,  of failed banks.  How can this
be done in such a way as to ensure that the new owners and managers have the right
incentives  to operate the newly recapitalized  bank in a prudent manner ensuring its good
subsequent  performance? How can the government's  budget and the interests of the
taxpayer be protected? What account needs to be taken of the impact of the
recapitalization  on aggregate  monetary conditions?
When a substantial part of the banking system is insolvent, these questions have
significant  consequences for the budget deficit, for the conduct of monetary policy, and
for the profitability of, and incentive structure for, the recapitalized banks. Although the
principles discussed here are valid for individual  bank restructuring, they become more
important the more widespread  or extensive is the incidence of bank failure.
These issues have proved controversial.
- Some practitioners  argue that the uncertainty surrounding  the true recoverable  value
of the bank's remaining  assets means that the authorities  should not feel obliged toallocate immediately the maximum  amount that could conceivably  be required; as
against this others note that even the new management  of an undercapitalized  bank
could be tempted to adopt too risky a strategy. The proposed resolution here is that
the bank must be adequately capitalized,  but with the government  retaining a claim
that enables it to benefit from unexpectedly  favorable subsequent performance.
- The fiscal authorities  are often keen to defer the fiscal realization  of the problem,
whether through zero-coupon  bonds, non-marketable  instruments or other
mechanisms which appear to reduce the cost, but can ultimately  increase it.  It will
not usually be necessary  to provide cash, and indeed long-term bonds often seem to
be the option that is preferred by governments.  But the yield and other
characteristics  of these bonds does matter. In particular, there is a temptation for the
government to issue bonds carrying below-market  interest, but this should be avoided
especially if it leaves the bank economically  insolvent, and thus at risk of looting,
despite satisfying simplistic  accounting  solvency ratios.  And other features are also
important, including marketability,  maturity and frequency of repricing interest.
- Injecting  marketable instruments into the banking system raises issues of monetary
policy. If the banks are thereby made too liquid, the excessive liquidity needs to be
mopped-up by other instruments  of monetary policy. But the important point is that
this can normally be done. Therefore monetary policy should respond  to the
recapitalization,  rather than determining its design.
To some extent our approach is a counsel of perfection. In practice, there will inevitably
be a certain amount of unavoidable "muddling  through". But the muddle will be more
easily navigable if ideal principles are kept in mind.
Dependence on country conditions
No single approach is likely to meet all possible initial conditions. This paper attempts  to
set out the major considerations involved in a way which will allow solutions for specific
cases to be developed in a way that is sensitive to country conditions. To some extent the
best solution, and indeed the available range of solutions, will depend on the scale of the
initial insolvency in the banking system, but other elements of pre-existing country
conditions are probably more important.
The key concept is credibility. The range of instruments  and strategies available to
government depends on its credibility. We suggest that relevant dimensions of
government credibility include (i) its pre-existing  indebtedness and its capacity to tax
(higher indebtedness  relative to taxing capacity imply low credibility for future spending
promises); (ii) the solidity of contractual commitment  (if these are already weak, it is
hard for the goverrnent  to have its promises taken seriously, as its potential contractual
partners perceive that reneging in the future will have little cost to it); (iii) the
institutional arrangements  for monetary and exchange rate policy (where these are weak,
the possibility of surprise  inflationary finance will always be discounted in any dealings
agents may have with the government).
2A second key determinant of what is possible is the sophistication,  depth and liquidity of
the capital markets. If there is no kading in long-term debt instruments,  for example,  it is
hard to price fixed-interest  bonds that might be injected into a bank's balance sheet and,
while steps can be taken to develop bond markets, the circumstances  surrounding  bank
failure may not be the very best for doing this.
The general solution:four distinct tools to be applied in a logical sequence
The general solution proposed  here is that four distinct policy tools need to be used for
four distinct goals, but in concert. The tools are: injecting assets, adjusting capital claims
on the bank, rebalancing the government's  own debt management,  and managing
monetary policy instruments  to maintain monetary stability
Before anything else, the government has to decide how much the of the banks' liabilities
it is prepared to assume (and accordingly  how much of the losses  will remain to be borne
by the banks' creditors).'  This decision needs to take into account the ultimate
consequences for the taxpayer and the beneficiary of government  spending programs that
may ultimately have to be curtailed as a result of the rescue. Once the decision has been
taken, however, the actual policy instruments that are adopted can be chosen according to
the following logical sequence,  which simplifies decision-making.
First, the government (or its agencies) typically needs to inject assets into the banking
system:  their effective and actual maturity, their yield and their liquidity should be
governed by the goals of restoring  the bank to a capitalization  and prospective earnings
profile consistent with safe-and-sound  banking.  This typically means that the assets
should be marketable, bearing floating market-related  interest rates and preferably with
maturities no longer than those actually traded in the market;  in short they should be
bankable. The risk-profile  of the assets is also a consideration,  for example if their value
is still linked to loan recovery, or if the government's own creditworthiness  is not high:
here financial engineering  can help.
Second, the liability side of the bank's balance sheet may also need to be restructured.
Government's claims here represent the government's quid-pro-quo  for funds injected,
and they represent an attempt to secure, in the event of a better-than-expected  outturn for
the bank, some return to the taxpayer consistent with an adequate  incentive structure for
the bank's private owners.
Given the policy stance adopted  for the first two tools, the remaining  two are adjusted to
meet the goals offiscal and monetary management.
' In particular, it is not always the case that all depositors should bailed-out. In practice, even short of
leaving them to their share in the liquidation  (and to any entitlement  they may have from a formal deposit
insurance scheme), many alternatives  have been tried, including temporary  depositor freezes, forced write-
downs and/or conversion of deposits  to long-term claims on government.  While this paper does not address
the relative merits of these alternatives,  it is worth distinguishing  between  those that impose transparent
losses on depositors, and those, like discount bonds, which pretend  to provide  more protection to the
depositors than they really do.
3The third step is then re-balancing  the government's debt structure. The first two tools
will have an impact on the time profile of the govermment's  cash position. Re-optimizing
its deficit and debt management  policy conditional on this impact  will give rise to a need
to adjust spending, tax and debt issuance policy.
Finally, monetary policy has sufficient instruments  to offset any untoward impact of the
remaining policies on monetary stability.
This logical ordering allows for a simplified allocation of responsibilities  between
different arms of government.
Organization  ofpaper
The paper is organized as follows: We begin (Section 2) with how an injection of assets
in the financial restructuring  of failed banks can best be designed  to restore bank capital,
liquidity and incentives. Section 3 discusses the capital-type  claims which the
government may acquire as a counterpart of the asset injection, and to allow it to claw-
back some of the injection  of value in the event of unexpectedly  favorable debt recovery.
Section 4 examines the consequences  for the budget and debt management. Section 5
draws out the implications for monetary policy and macroeconomic  stability.  Section 6
concludes. There are three annexes: Annex I reviews some features of five important
recent cases (Argentina, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Mexico and Thailand) illustrating how the
issues discussed here have arisen and been addressed in practice; Annex 2 summarizes
the key elements of the Basel rules on what constitutes  capital; Annex 3 works through a
schematic and numerical  balance sheet example.
A caveat: bank restructuring  requires much more than getting  the financial structures
right; it should be recognized  that this paper focuses  on only one aspect of a wider
problem. In particular, we assume that a competent,  fit and proper management are in
place, that the bank's operational  procedures and information  systems are adequate and
that operating costs are under control. It is also assumed that the policy environment
within which the banks are operating is consistent with banks operating both prudently
and profitably. 2
2  Ensuring the Bank Has Enough Capital, Liquidity and Incentives
Probably the most crucial issue in bank recapitalization  is that of ensuring that the bank
truly moves forward with adequate capital. 3 This is not always achieved even by
schemes that purport to do so. The most common method, and the one we will
concentrate on, involves the government injecting asset into the bank's balance sheet.
Typically this is not cash; instead, non-perforrning  assets are replaced or supplemented in
the bank's portfolio by a government  bond or obligation.
2 Useful references for this wider context include Alexander  et al. (1997), Dziobek (1998), Enoch et al.
(1999), Roulier (1995) and Sheng  (1996).
3This  is not merely common sense. Repeated bank recapitalizations  are found to be associated with higher
fiscal costs in an econometric analysis of some 40 crises (Honohan  and Klingebiel,  2000)
4Recall that we are starting the analysis from the point where the government has already
(i) decided that a restructured  bank will be recapitalized  and taken into majority  private
ownership; (ii) assessed  the recoverable  value of the old assets that will be held in the
bank's balance sheet and (iii) decided on the issue of loss allocation and on which classes
of the old liabilities are to be on the balance sheet.  The to-be-recapitalized  bank's balance
sheet already reflects these decisions and thus begins either with negative capital, or with
positive but inadequate capital.
The bank's new shareholders  will be putting up funds. After all, they will end-up with a
fully capitalized  bank together with some franchise  value. Indeed, if the bank's balance
sheet contains some positive capital going into the recapitalization,  then one may be able
to leave it to the new shareholders  to inject enough funds to reach the regulatory capital
requirement. But if the bank's initial capital is negative,  then the government  will also be
injecting funds.
In this section we ask what the terms and conditions  of the injected assets should be.  In
return for injecting assets, the government may acquire a capital claim on the bank. The
terms of such a claim are considered in section 3
Alternatives to injecting assets.
Before proceeding to discuss what the injected assets should look like, it is worth briefly
mentioning the two main alternatives  to injecting  assets, namely (i) some of the liabilities
of the bank are assumed by the government or by a public agency (for example  a deposit
protection agency); or (ii) delinquent  borrowers are subsidized  with a view to helping
them service their bank borrowings.
Assuming the deposit liabilities
Even if a government agency assumes the deposit liabilities,  this is rarely the whole story.
Depositors do not want their money in cash; they want a banking relationship  and a
deposit. In the case where the bank is liquidated  and the deposit insurer pays out in cash,
the eventual result will be that most of the depositors will redeposit the pay-out in another
bank, which in turn will have the cash at its disposal to invest. If the government  has
funded a cash payout by issuing new government  bonds to the market in general, the end
result may well be that the banks that have acquired  the migrating depositors invest  the
resources so received in these bonds. From the point of view of the system as a whole,
therefore, the first of the two alternatives reduces to something close to the second.
Nor do the depositors want long-term bonds. Several banking crises have been
processed by the conversion  of frozen deposits into long-term bonds, perhaps at a
discount. To the extent that the bonds are marketable,  depositors will again trade these
for bank deposits with much the same overall net effect as if the bonds had been directly
injected into the banking system. 4
4Ecuador's  1999-2000  banking crisis is being resolved along these lines, as have previous crises  in Latin
America, notably in Brazil 1990-91.
5The indirect approach' subsidizing the borrowers
Some governments attempt to solve the banks' problems by subsidizing  the delinquent
borrowers with a view to restoring the bank's assets to performing status (cf. the Mexican
case). While the general question of industrial  subsidies is beyond the scope of the
present paper, this indirect approach is likely to be a costly way of dealing with bank
insolvency. Bringing borrowers back to economic  health will generally  entail larger
subventions than those needed simply to make good on their bank borrowings. Besides,
the deadweight of unnecessary subsidy that is inevitably involved in government
programs is duplicated if both banks and borrowers  are being dealt with.  The
extraordinary  budgetary cost of the early (1982) Chilean crisis is likely at least partly
attributable to the decision to bail-out borrowers.
Ensuring credibility of the instruments employed
Assuming then that the government has opted for the bond injection, we now consider
how this should be done.
Credibility is the overriding requirement. This requires firstly that the fiscal costs that are
entailed can be absorbed, and that the government's  prospective debt profile is a
sustainable one.  It also requires that, even though the government is handing out money
now, it is not thereby signaling an open-ended  intention to bail-out shareholders,
managers or large creditors in future.
But credibility is also required at the level of the financial instruments used to replace bad
debts in the balance sheet of insolvent banks. There is always a temptation for
governments to opt for injecting an instrument  with low cash outlays. For example, a
government might simply offer the bank a non-interest-bearing  bullet bond with a long
maturity, but the same face value as that of the non-performing assets.  The real value of
such a bond falls well short of the value of performing  loans of equal face value. A bank
that is offered no more than that in return for ceding non-performing  loans is likely to run
into difficulties again, as its operations cannot easily be brought back to profitability.
Even if sufficient zero-coupon  bonds are injected to bring the net present  value of the
promised payments up to the required level (when calculated at the risk-free discount
rate), such an arrangement cannot be regarded as satisfactory from the credibility point of
view. A government  which acts like that will be suspected of temporizing. Market
participants will likely assume that it has no clear idea of how it is going to fund the
bullet payment at maturity. Accordingly, holders will discount the value of the bond,
attaching only a moderate probability to its being honored in full and on time.  Marked-
to-market, a bank holding such an asset may still be insolvent, and may feel itself to be
insolvent, with all of the incentive problems that creates. If the bond is tradable in a
fairly competitive market, these valuation and credibility problems will come out in the
open and force the government to face up to them. 5
5 As outlined in the annex, these issues arose acutely in the case of the Bulgarian "Zunk" bonds, which
were held in  the books  of the banks  at values  that  were  much  higher  than  their market  value,  essentially
because the coupon rate was much lower than market yields on Bulgarian sovereign  debt.
6Even if the government avoids zero interest or deep-discount bonds, and even if it
ensures an adequate injection in net present value terms, some of the same  issues may
still arise, in an attenuated way. They can be eased by instrument design in terms of
maturity, yield and negotiability,  and possibly, if necessary, by supplementary
enhancements.
Maturity, yield and negotiability of injected assets
In the presence of deep capital markets with a wide range of available maturities, the
exact maturity of any marketable government  bond injected into the bank will be of little
consequence for the incentives facing the bank, as the bank will easily and speedily be
able to exchange it for assets of the desired maturity. Even if the injection  of funds is
large relative to the overall size of the capital markets, the choice of maturity can be left
as a matter of overall debt management  policy, and not as one of banking policy.
In countries where the capital markets are not so deep, the choice of maturity matters
more. Once again there is a temptation for the government to lock the bank in, with the
use of long-terrn  bonds not easily (or perhaps at all) marketable. But use of long-term
bonds in such circumstances has at least four drawbacks (cf. the account of Mexico,
Annex 1).
- First, they are difficult to value: if there is no active long-term bond market, the
authorities may (and do) argue that the appropriate  long-term interest rate is much
lower than current short-term interest rates. But unless the bank can convert some of
its liabilities into a form that has equally low yield, this will create a long-term
profitability gap which will tend to result in decapitalization  of the bank over time.
- Second, much as with zero coupon bonds, though to a lesser extent, government
reluctance to commit contractually  to repaying  this indebtedness  fairly soon may
create a doubt as to authorities' real commitment  to honoring it. Potential bank
owners may discount the value of the bonds, and hence be reluctant  to invest in the
bank.
- Third, the strategy may induce too much maturity transformation  into the bank's
balance sheet. If the long-term bond bears a fixed interest rate, this will expose the
bank to the risk that market interest rates will change (this can be avoided  by
specifying  that the bond's interest rate float with the market). The bank's ability to
resume lending to the private sector  will be limited for the duration of the bond's
maturity, thereby reducing the flexibility  of the banking system's response to
emerging lending opportunities.
- Fourth is the question of cash-flow. Even if the prospective capital gain on the bond
as it nears maturity is enough for the bank to remain solvent over the years, in
practice the bank could have to pay interest to depositors out of net loan repayments,
a situation which will place a constant pressure on the bank to expand its deposit base
so that it can even maintain loan supply to existing clients. In short, this bank does
not have a normal growth environment,  and will therefore be stressed.
7A more natural approach is to inject a type of asset which is more in line with the sort of
asset which a bank would voluntarily  hold on its balance sheet: short-term,  and with
interest rate floating in line with the market. In short, with an asset that can readily be
regarded as "bankable".
Such an instrument can more easily be made marketable, thereby freeing the bank to
move forward with an asset-side  strategy  that is not dependent on its particular failure
history. If marketable, even longer-term  bonds will do this, provided  their maturity is not
beyond what can conveniently be traded on the local market.
Currency of denomination
Normally, the assets injected will be denominated  in local currency. However, when the
banking crisis is associated with a currency crisis, and/or when the banking system is
dollarized, local currency assets may not provide an adequate currency match for the
bank. Issue of foreign-currency  denominated  securities by the government  may then be
unavoidable (this was done, for example,  in Bulgaria, cf. Annex I).
Possible Enhancements
When a government's credibility is in doubt, it may have to go further than just providing
a marketable instrument if the banks are to feel secure.6 Here are some illustrations of
enhancements that have been offered in particular circumstances.
The injected assets were endowed with privileged  access to central  bank buy-back
provisions in the West African  part of the CFA zone - UEMOA - in the early 1990s. Of
course this should not be considered  normal or necessary, but in the particular
circumstances,  the buy-back provision may have helped the credibility  of the bonds,
offered as it was by a regional (multi-country)  central bank in conditions  of some doubt
as to the creditworthiness of some of the governments  concerned.
In the other CFA zone (CEMAC),  Cameroon  employed two interesting  devices to
enhance the credibility of injected bonds (See Annex 1). Specifically,  in 1998-99 (after
several years of uncertainty), the Government  of Cameroon converted  the recapitalized
banks' claims on it into negotiable bonds. The interesting  dimension is the way in which
these bonds received credit enhancements. One portion (with medium-long  term
maturities) was secured by an escrow account at the regional (multi-country)  central
bank, into which earmarked fiscal receipts were deposited. This can be seen as the
establishment  of a kind of segregated  sinking fund, with mutual reliance on the
independence  of the multinational central bank as a trustee. The remaining  portion, with
30-year maturity, were backed ("Brady"-like)  by a zero-coupon French Government bond
of the same maturity.
6 Providing a credible funding mechanism  for the servicing of the debts of the new Mexican restructuring
agency IPAB has been central to the re-launched  strategy in that country. A good example  of what can be
done to boost the credibility of the recapitalization  comes from Cameroon and is discussed below.
8One innovative approach recently employed in Argentina (see de la Torre, 2000 and
Annex 1) involved securitization  of the bad loan portfolio (which was assumed by a
separate company) into three tranches,  with the senior tranche only being left with the
restructured bank.  On the assumption  that recoveries would be sufficient to service the
senior tranche in full, this left the bank with a bankable asset (and in any case it is
negotiable).
Less attractive forms of enhancement  come in the form of guarantees  offered bilaterally
by the authorities to the restructured  bank in respect on the value of their loan portfolio.
These can be in the form of yield maintenance  agreements,  stop-loss  guarantees or put-
back options (allowing the bank to sell the asset to the government  at a pre-fixed price).
From the point of view of getting the bank on a forward-looking  path under financial
autonomy, the potential problem is that such bilateral arrangements  risk keeping the
government too closely involved  in the ongoing business of the bank.
If the credibility of the government  with investors is problematic,  then attempts by it to
provide enhancement may eventually  cost more than they are initially valued in the
market. Over-complex enhancement  may prove undesirable for this reason.
Summary on injecting assets
From the banking policy point  of view, the financial instruments  injected by the
government into the failed bank should be tradable in a liquid market (if there is such a
market). Ideally, they would bear adjustable  interest rates linked  to money market rates,
thereby avoiding the introduction  of unwarranted interest rate risk. Finally they should
not be at a maturity beyond that which can be traded in the local market. Some of these
considerations are less important  where wholesale financial markets are sufficiently
developed  to allow the maturity  and interest risk characteristics  of the banks' investment
portfolio to be altered through market transactions, but this will not always be the case.
3  Government Capital Claims on the Bank
As part of the process of recapitalization,  the government or its agency may also acquire
a claim, often subordinated,  on the bank. There are two aspects  to this: first is the
counterpart  of the bond injection. Second is a possible claim on better-than-expected
recovery on the failed bank's assets. The purpose of these claims is to ensure that the
restructuring is achieved at the least cost (in net present value terms) to the taxpayer.
Impact of bond injection on the liability side of the bank's balance  sheet.
As a counterpart of an injection  of assets into the bank's balance  sheet there must
obviously be a corresponding  increase on the liability side. If the injection comes
without any specific quidproquo,  then it will be the value of the shareholders'  funds that
increases, as the owners of the bank's equity normally have the residual claim on the
bank's assets, after other liabilities  have been paid.
9The bank's capital consists of these shareholders' funds plus other long-term claims that
are subordinated to the claims of depositors.7 Therefore, the unrequited injection of an
asset into a bank also increases  the bank's capital. (The new asset is clearly not itself part
of the bank's capital, as the capital is a residual. The asset may be liquid or illiquid, with
a short- or long-term maturity;  none of that affects the degree to which its injection
increases the bank's capital).
Note also that, the economic  value (as distinct from the balance sheet value) of the equity
claims may increase by more  than the market value of the injected bond to the extent that
the injection brings the bank into regulatory compliance, enabling it to move forward and
to earn profits from its franchise.
When the government injects an asset, it may therefore also choose to acquire an explicit
capital-type claim on the bank especially if it has injected enough to bring the bank's
capital strictly above zero.  Otherwise,  part of the injection may simply represent a
transfer from the taxpayer to the new shareholders.
Comparing the before- and after-restructuring,  therefore, we can imagine the assets side
of the bank being increased by (A) an injection by the government  and (B) an injection
from the (new) owners. The government may want to acquire (C) some form of capital
claim on the liability side; if there is no injection from the new owners, this will
definitely be the case.
Note a curious distinction which arises as to the nature of the asset that can be injected.
The government is free to inject a claim on itself as an appropriate  asset, whereas the
private owners may not do this. The problem is that, if private shareholders  just inject a
claim on themselves, they do not truly have much net capital at stake, and they will not
therefore have appropriate incentives  to minimize the probability  of the bank failing
(something like this seems to have occurred in the failed Mexican privatizations of the
early 1990s).8
Simply stated, a natural benchmark solution (though as noted below under "scale" it is
not the only one) is for the government  to inject enough under A to bring the calculated
capital up to zero, with the owners  injecting the further sums under B required to bring
the capital up to the regulatory minimum. In accounting  terms, this may appear to be a
zero-value transaction for the owners, and as such of limited appeal to private wealth-
7 The Basel capital accord established  some widely accepted rules concerning  the calculation of capital.
Given that capital is the residual obtained by subtracting non-capital liabilities  from total assets, we may
think of these rules as (i) defining certain measurement principles for the asset side items of the balance
sheet (notably related to asset revaluation  reserves and general loan-loan  loss provisions) and (ii) specifying
which subordinated liabilities can be counted as "capital"  and thus need not be subtracted from total assets
See Annex 2 for a summary of the key elements  here.
8 The bank's owners will gain disproportionately  from risky management strategies  inasmuch as they
benefit from the upside risk, but suffer little from the downside.  For this and related reasons, most bank
regulatory structures place tight limits on lending to persons connected  with ownership or management.
Because it is neither truly free from the downside risk, nor standing to gain from the upside, the
government's injection of its own bonds is not subject to the same moral hazard.
10holders.  But in economic  terms, and more importantly  in terms of market value, the net
present value of the equity that the owners acquire in this scenario will be greater than the
cash value of the injected  asset, because (as mentioned)  of the franchise value - the
stream of future profits in excess of the risk-free rate of return  - of operating the bank.
(Annex 3 works through a simplified balance sheet example  to spell out these points).
Scale
Beyond stating that the restructured  bank should obviously  have enough capital to meet
the standard regulatory requirements,  it is unwise to be dogmatic about how the balance
between A, B and C should be struck. The more assets the government injects, the easier
it is to attract serious substantial shareholders  and give them suitable incentives. (In the
failed Mexican privatizations  of the early 1  990s, the government  arguably pressed the
new shareholders  for too high a cash outlay). On the other hand, public funds are scarce
and the government has to bear value-for-money  considerations  in mind.
In a major crisis, the fiscal authorities  may have to envisage injecting funds beyond the
point where the capital of the banking system back up to zero, but also to provide  some of
the required capital for future operation, if the system is not to suffer from a credit crunch
resulting from capital starvation (i.e. larger  A to make up for smaller B). After all, likely
investors in banking will be extremely cautious in the recessionary  post-crisis
environment.  The issue of private vs. public ownership  looms large here, but a variety of
intermediate and dynamic positions can be adopted,  useful especially for recapitalizing
banks at a time of low private sector confidence,  while ensuring a semi-automatic
transition to private ownership.
If the authorities do inject funds on this larger scale, they can expect to make a return on
the investment, and accordingly  they should take a claim C on the bank, the contractual
design of which needs to ensure that the claim on the one hand does qualify as capital,
but one the other hand keeps a pressure on the private owners to find enough capital to
buy out the government within a relatively short number of years.
Terms and conditions of government's new capital claims
Make them explicit
Just as the terms and conditions  of the bond injection matter, so too for the terms and
conditions of the new capital  claims (item C above)  which may be acquired by the
government as part of the restructuring. In some cases the terms of these claims have
been extremely vague, as in the case of Sri Lanka, where the claim had no particular
maturity but was simply repayable  "when the bank was in a position to do so".  Such a
vague conditionality  may seem lenient to the new bank, but in fact it can effectively
remove all of the bank's financial independence. As they may be unable ever to service
fully or repay this debt, the bank's management may be in effect beholden indefinitely  to
the government and become as it were civil servants, pursuing in practice not the goals of
the bank, but those of the relevant government ministry.
Instead, the government's claims on the banks should be expressed in clear and
unambiguous terms, and should ideally employ standard  financial instruments for which
11an established jurisprudence exists, allowing any disputes that might arise between  the
bank's private shareholders  and the state agency to be readily resolved at court. This also
argues for the legal holder of the governnent's claims to be a government agency rather
than the government itself.
In order not to be excluded from the Basel concept of capital, the government's  claims
must be sufficiently subordinated  to those of depositors  (See Annex 2 for a summary  of
the criteria for inclusion).
One form of claim which can do this is long-term subordinated  debt. If it has five-years'
initial maturity or longer, it can be counted towards Basel Tier 2 capital (though only for
an amount equivalent to 50% of core capital), provided  it is amortised at 20 per cent per
annum after its -remaining  maturity reaches five years.  Another alternative is for the
government to take perpetual  non-cumulative preference  shares convertible into equity
(under specified circumstances  - such as renewed deterioration  in the bank's capital) and
repayable at the option of the bank.
Benefitingfrom unexpectedlyfavorable  recovery
Neither of these two arrangements  would give the government any upside possibilities.
But this may be worth seeking. Even if there is no formal  provision from the outset for
the government to share in an unexpectedly favorable recovery of the bank's fortunes,
bank shareholders  may anyway suspect that, in such an event, they could have to make
significant ex  post payments  to government (perhaps in the form of special taxes)
designed to claw-back part of what will by then appear ex  post to have been an
excessively generous govermment  injection. 9 Better to eliminate the uncertainty by
settling this in advance.
Evidently a range of risk-sharing/profit-sharing  alternatives are available. These would
differ as to residual control rights (including warrants), profit sharing rules (including
specific sharing rules for earmarked loan recovery)  and maturity.
Claims related to bad debt recovery
Probably the best way of ensuring that the taxpayer benefits from an unexpectedly
favorable debt recovery  experience is to establish government  claims directly linked to
loan recovery. The non-performing  portfolio of loans that has caused the problem is
rarely worthless, and may be prove to be worth much more implied than conservative
valuations at the time of the restructuring. To the extent that the bad debt is being
removed from the bank, and the recovery managed elsewhere, this issue does not further
impinge on the design of the financial restructuring.1 0 But if the bad debt remains on the
new bank's balance sheet, albeit heavily provisioned  or written down, it may be desirable
9 For an account of the 1992 clawback in the case of AIB, see Honohan  and Kelly, 1997.
'° With good institutional  design and contracting for non-performing  asset management and recovery, the
government can hope to recover a portion of its initial outlay  - perhaps a very high proportion as was
achieved in Sweden  (Drees and Pazarbasioglu, 1998). But absent these conditions, devices such as
establishing a centralized asset recovery agency may prove  to be no more than an additional drain on the
budget (Klingebiel, 2000). The different ways of going about this are not the central concem of this paper
(cf. Enoch et aL, 1999).
12for the government  (or its agency) to retain an entitlement:  to share in the eventual  upside
of debt recovery.  By building in a substantial  claw-back of recoveries in this way, the
govermment  can safeguard the taxpayeres  position  even if the initial injection  of funds
required has been exaggerated by overly-conservative  accounting.  While this will
depress the incentive for the bank to recover, it does provide an improved incentive for
the bank not to exaggerate ex ante its estimate  of the degree to which the loans are
unrecoverable.
A capital budgeting perspective
It is possible to look at the question of government  injection of funds (beyond what is required to bring the
capital of the bank up to zero), and the design of the capital  claims, from a fiscal point of view as one of
capital budgeting. This allows a different perspective  to that provided  from the banking policy point of
view.  The capital budgeting perspective confirms  that it is proper to separate  the investment  decision (the
topic of this section) from that of financing (the topic of the next section).
An important principle  of public finance provides guidance  here, namely that the marginal  social return on
public spending needs to be higher than that on private spending,  because of the deadweight  marginal cost
of public funds.'  This principle implies that the government  should be slow to spend public funds except
where there is a "public good" aspect - a social return that cannot be captured by private entities. One such
case is when, from the private investors' point of view,  the risks facing the bank are substantially  political
in nature.' 2 Thus, if investors fear that the government  will seek to claw-back a disproportionate  recovery
in the fortunes of the tax through exceptional explicit or implicit taxation, and if the government  does not
have the credibility to convince the market that it has no intention  of doing this, it would be inefficient  of
the government to sell the bank to a skeptical  market  realizing a price discounted by the market's
expectation of future expropriation  or disproportionate  taxation. That would amount to an'ex  post transfer
of scarce budgetary funds to the purchasers. So in this case a financial instrument  must be sought  which
allows the government  to realize some of the upside gain from a recovery of market confidence.
This is not an unrealistic  scenario in the middle  of a systemic crisis, when the government's  options seem
limited and the likelihood  of onerous future taxation can seem high. It is in precisely this kind of condition
that the government  may wish to consider a risk-and-return  sharing investment in the bank.  Thus,  as
already suggested in the text, the decision as to how much of a stake the govemment should  take in the
newly capitalized bank will be partly dependent on the outcome of its bargaining  strength vis-a-vis new
shareholders.
We have seen this kind of mechanism,  for example, in Mexico,  when as a quid-pro-quo
for injecting funds, the government  received a claim on the recoveries. This sort of claim
need not just be a fixed percentage share.' 3 In principle quite complex contracts  with
embedded options can be envisaged,  but only if there is a shared understanding  that the
contracts are going to be honored on both sides.  1 4 Complexity  need not be a problem
" The point is that, in order to raise funds to pay for public projects, the government  must impose taxes
which, at the margin, impose a costly distortion on private sector behavior (except in the unlikely  case that
it has at its disposal sufficient lump-sum  or corrective  taxes). Cf. Squire (1989).
1  If capital markets are very incomplete  there could also be an (Arrow-Lind type) argument  for the
government to assume a risk that is too large for individual  wealth holders to absorb. Nowadays,  such an
argument is only likely to be relevant for transitory periods during an economic  crash.
3 In the Mexican deal, the government gets 25+0.75r per cent, where r is the percentage recovery  rate.
14 More popular devices that have been negotiated  bilaterally  by restructured  banks include stop-loss
guarantees and yield maintenance arrangements  offered by the authorities, or put-back  options granted to
the bank.  Far from giving the government  a share in the up-side, these particular types of contract
generally involve hidden and potentially  large future liabilities for the government and often leave  the bank
with poor incentive  to recover.
13under those circumstances, but clarity is certainly needed. A contract structure that is so
vague that it will eventually have to be litigated, or which leaves either side considerable
discretion is unlikely to create the correct incentives going forward.' 5
A schedular approach
Bank restructurings can generate  expectations  regarding the future availability  of
bailouts. They also present difficulties  for transparency, with frequent accusations after
the event that particular investors were favored in the restructuring and allowed to
acquire a sound bank for too little money.' 6
Some of these difficulties can be avoided by the announcement in a crisis of a special
time-bound schedule or menu of capital assistance. Different versions of this have been
tried in Thailand and Mexico (Annex 1). The authorities announce  that budgetary funds
will be available, but only on condition that private shareholders  put in a proportionate
amount. Similar schedular arrangements  have been announced for subsidized loan
purchase schemes; in Thailand, shareholders  effectively had a menu of alternative options
from which to choose.
Of course any such scheme will have a deadweight cost which advocates of micro-
managed intervention may claim to avoid. (Thus if micro-management  can deliver an
exact knowledge of the capital deficiency  of the bank, and of its franchise value, this
could enable the governnent to get it going again in an adequately  capitalized  manner at
lower cost). But by offering a menu, and doing so publicly, the government can draw
also on the private sector's strengths in valuing assets and in perceiving  business
opportunities.  1 7
Also, many new investors will be attracted to a semi-automatic  recapitalization
mechanism,  whereas they would be uninterested  in entering into a highly contingent and
uncertain  bilateral negotiation with the government.  Thus, provided  the menu is
generous enough overall, it can help attract a wider group of investors and as such
enhance the value of the banking business which the goverrnent  is trying to rehabilitate.
"s  None of the cases discussed in Annex I presents a fully satisfactory solution to the problem of recovery
on delinquent loans and seized collateral. In Thailand most of the loans were still on the bank's books three
years after the crisis broke; those acquired from non-bank  finance companies  have been disposed of at a
discount of about 75%, and even then a new government  agency was a residual buyer for many of them. In
Mexico, the restructuring agency acquired some of the delinquent loans outright, while in other cases, as
mentioned,  it acquired a claim on recoveries made by the banks: the projected recovery rate from the
acquired loans is only 20 per cent. The innovative  securitization  approach in Argentina,  mentioned above,
has been criticized for lacking adequate incentives  to promote loan recovery.  Cameroon's  SRC had
recovered less than 3 per cent of its portfolio after half a decade.
16 Credit Lyonnais bank negotiated exclusively  with the authorities for the purchase  of SCB bank in
Cameroon  in the late 1980s.
17 But offering a recapitalization menu cannot be a substitute for intervening  undercapitalized  banks, as is
suggested was a problem in Thailand  (Claessens and Klingebiel, 1999).
144.  Implications for debt management
In this section we look at the implications of the restructuring  for the government's
budgetary strategy. As before, we begin the analysis at the point where the government
has decided to protect depositors from (some portion of) their prospective losses in a
bank which has failed and is being intervened. Some of these costs may be incurred
outside of the recapitalization  per se (as when insured depositors are paid-off separately,
or when subsidies are paid to delinquent  borrowers).
Needfor  ensuring afeasible overallfiscalplan
All of the discussion of the previous  two sections has assumed that the government
already has a feasible general plan in terms of absorbing the total costs, whether through
increased taxation, reduced spending,  the inflation  tax, or a new sustainable  time-path of
overall indebtedness. This is not a foregone  conclusion. The market may call into
question the government's ability and willingness  to meet out of additional tax revenues,
or expenditure  cutbacks, the liabilities  that it has suddenly assumed. The fall-back
position of government may be to allow inflation and currency  depreciation.'8 Or it may
slip into arrears and default.  The huge size of some of the failures in recent years has
placed a question-mark over the viability of govermnents'  budgetary and exchange
rate/inflation strategy, and some have argued that this has provided a causal linkage from
bank failure to currency collapse.' 9 A credible financing plan must be in place to guard
against self-fulfilling market expectations  driving the economy into a bad equilibrium
here.  However, these matters are not the focus of the present paper.
Adjusting debt managementfor the consequences of restructuring
As part of the recapitalization,  the government will, as discussed,  injects some bonds, and
may acquire some claims on the newly recapitalized bank. It may also acquire claims
over some of the recovery of the failed banks' bad assets. In this way, the government's
portfolio of debt and financial assets has altered as a result of the rescue and bank
recapitalization.  This implies commitment  to a stream of cash outflows and receipts --
some of them certain, others contingent.
Most budget managers will intuitively look first at the immediate  cash costs of any
restructuring policy, and then for the implications for cash-flow  in the first few years
following. This can become an all-determining  pre-occupation,  especially for a
government with limited taxing capacity, for one with limited access to the financial
markets and for one which is operating under an IMF program which constrains cash
outlays. Most options for the recapitalization  need not involve substantial immediate
cash outlays, but we have stressed that choosing a policy on the basis of its cash-flow
implications is unlikely to be the optimal policy, even from a narrow fiscal management
perspective.
Is Whether intended or not (probably  not) it was the outcome in Bulgaria, 1996.  For a theoretical discussion
of this type of problem, see Bumside  et al. (1998).
'9 E.g. Chang and Velasco, 1998. Though of course the reverse causality  has also been important.
15Instead, we have proposed that the design of the restructuring should be determined on
the basis of banking policy and net present value considerations,  and not on cash-flow
considerations. Just as investment  and financing decisions are normally kept separate, so
too, the government should look at the cash-flow consequences  of the restructuring as
presenting a task to be resolved  by debt management and overall fiscal policy (and not as
a reason for reconsidering the design of the restructuring. The decision as to whether this
should be financed by taxation,  by reduction of public spending, or by additional
borrowing is one which is then wholly independent  of banking  policy considerations. It
is a pure question of debt management  and overall fiscal policy. In practice, bank failure
is sufficiently rare that it will generally  be optimal to smooth its impact on taxation and
public spending over a number of years. Thus, there will be a need for new borrowing, if
available. Some of this borrowing is done, in effect, through the issue of bonds to be
injected. If the maturity of these bonds is not optimal for debt management purposes,
then a restructuring of the maturity of the remainder  of the government's overall debt
portfolio is the way to go. In other words, the restructuring will have resulted in a change
in the stock and characteristics  of financial instruments issued by the government. In
general, this will give rise to a need for rebalancing the government's  remaining debt
portfolio.
Use of other government agencies
A need for additional borrowing  by the central government  can draw attention to the
deterioration in the fiscal position in a way which may can be unwelcome. It is not clear
whether accounting treatment really does matter, or whether  markets can see through
different approached to accounting  for the same economic  decisions. In practice,
governments tend to welcome legitimate  reasons for keeping expenditures off-budget.
That is one motivation for isolating the financing of bank failure through an ancillary
government agency such as a deposit insurer.
There are some risks in this approach. If the deposit insurer's borrowings  do not carry the
full guarantee of the national government, they may have to offer higher yields (a
credibility effect). Even though the deposit insurer may benefit from an earmarked tax,
such as deposit insurance premia, the revenue may not be sufficient in a crisis.  Likewise
if the deposit insurer has a statutorily  imposed borrowing ceiling,  relying on it to make
the optimal investment or financing decision may prove unwise.
If it is a government agency assuming  the liabilities, then the agency must be in a
position to meet cash calls. If it does not itself have cash or liquid reserves, this may be
done through its own borrowing,  but if it has no statutory authority  to borrow, or if it
cannot call on a government guarantee, the cost and difficulty  of making this borrowing
may well induce the agency to seek an alternative approach which could prove more
expensive in  the long run. There are examples from the USA in the late 1  980s, and from
Argentina more recently. These have involved the agency either engineering tax-
advantaged arrangements which have passed the cost to the revenue authorities (USA), or
substituting assumption of implicit future commitments for explicit borrowing
(Argentina), in each case possibly increasing the net fiscal cost in the process.
16In general, the advantages  of leaving the decision to an ancillary agency are chiefly those
of achieving focus and perhaps retaining independence  from interference from political
personalities. Thus, while the use of other agencies in this activity can have some
favorable incentive effects for the relevant public officials, and can also improve the
accounting presentation of the government's actions, financing is unlikely to be the strong
point of ancillary agencies (this includes the central bank).  (In the Mexican case, the
new agency IPAB will now being going to the markets in competition with the Federal
Government, and perhaps still paying a premium relative  to the Government)
5.  Implications for monetary policy
The final piece of the jigsaw is the response of monetary policy instruments to ensure that
the resolution does not destabilize monetary conditions  in an unintended way. Basically,
our approach is to see the bank restructuring as something  to which monetary policy
should respond. In other words, monetary consequences  should not be a central
consideration or a constraint  for those designing  the restructuring.
Nevertheless, the impact  of bank resolution policy on monetary conditions can come in
either of two forms: a direct effect through central bank cash injections in a failing bank,
or indirectly through the consequences of fiscal action to restructure the failed bank.
Ideally, then, the financial restructuring is handled as a directly fiscal matter, in which
case the role of monetary policy is to adjust liquidity  conditions  to ensure that the goals
of monetary policy are not accidentally  compromised  by the financial instruments  that
have been created by the restructuring.  However, in practice, the central bank is often
the first official agency in line to provide financial support  to a failing bank (the Thai
case is a clear example).
Direct central bank lending
The term "lender of last resort" often proves to be a misnomer in this respect. While it
may be a last resort in the sense that all potential private sector lenders have refused, the
central bank is often the only government agency with the resources and the authority to
make large liquidity loans promptly in a crisis. Indeed, unless governed by restrictive
legislation such as that of a currency board, the central  bank always has the wherewithal
to cover domestic currency  obligations arising out of a bank failure.
Central banking doctrine makes a sharp distinction between liquidity loans and solvency
support. The former are made to a bank which is under cash pressure, but is expected  to
be able ultimately to liquidate  its portfolio. According  to the doctrine liquidity loans
should only be made against adequate collateral. According  to the same doctrine,
solvency support (i.e. loans to an insolvent institution)  should not be made by the
monetary authority, as this will fuel inflation. If this doctrine is followed, then we are in
the ideal situation where monetary consequences can be separated from fiscal
consequences.
17Unfortunately, distinguishing  between solvent and insolvent among illiquid banks is not
easy to accomplish in the limited time available for deciding whether or not to grant a
liquidity loan. Even if the central bank suspects that the bank is insolvent, it will come
under pressure to meet the short-term needs. And  the quality of the collateral available to
secure the lending is likely to prove questionable,  especially in a generalized crisis. In
short, the central bank will often find itself with claims on an insolvent bank, and as such
a primary source of capital injections into the banking  system.
And these will be cash injections. As such, unless the cash injection is sterilized, the
consequence will be inflation  (or, if there is a fixed exchange rate, an outflow of funds
through the current account of balance of payments). The "inflation tax" has often been
used to help pay for banking  collapses. It is a tax with rather arbitrary incidence (the very
poor and the very rich do not hold much cash; also unexpected  inflation results in
substantial transfers between different segments  of society whose incomes depend on
contracts fixed in nominal terms). Furthermore,  an unexpected  surge in inflation can
trigger a lengthy process of adjustment during which inflation well overshoots what is
strictly needed to pay for the initial deficiency. Getting  this under control again can often
result in a recession; besides which, cross-country  studies establish that, beyond a
moderate level, inflation damages growth. Any country choosing this route should
recognize what it is doing, and not see the use of central bank funds as an easy option.
If there is a fixed exchange rate regime in effect, or when the failing bank has significant
foreign exchange obligations,  the central bank may no longer be able to provide cash to
meet the claims of depositors  and still hold to the exchange  rate peg. This is seen in
graphic form in a currency board arrangement  (as in Argentina and now Bulgaria, for
example), where the statutory constraints on the currency  board's authority to make loans
reflects the absolute priority given to the exchange rate peg.
One of the least satisfactory  aspects of central bank financing of bank insolvency is that
accounting for such support is often opaque. The total cost absorbed, whether by the
fiscal authorities or by the inflation tax, is usually  hard to determine. Among the
difficulties are the off-market interest rates normally applied to many central bank assets
and liabilities; support to an insolvent bank will change the amounts subject to these off-
market rates. Few if any central banks properly and fully account for the implicit
subsidies and taxes that are thereby triggered. For example,  since the production of high-
powered money appears in accounting  terms to be virtually costless, any interest return
on a loan made by the central bank may appear to be profitable,  but it represents an
expansion of the base for inflation tax.20 Another example comes from exchange rate
guarantees, preferential exchange rates provided  to failing banks which need to repay
foreign debt and similar arrangements  undertaken  just before or after an exchange rate
collapse triggered by the banking problems.
Many a central bank has found itself technically insolvent  and unable to pay its
administrative expenses because of an accumulation  of such implicit forms of assistance.
20 For a discussion of alternative measures of seigniorage  and the inflation  tax, see Honohan (1996)
18This can damage the operational and policy independence  of the central bank, and needs
to be corrected  through a financial restructuring  of the central bank.
Protecting monetary stability
Returning, though, to the preferable case, where the restructuring of the failed
(commercial)  bank has been rightly treated in the first instance as a fiscal matter,  what
remains to be discussed is the needed central  bank response to ensure maintenance  of
monetary stability.
Decide whether there is to be an impact on inflation  and exchange rate
Here the important points are threefold. First, there must be a clear understanding
between monetary and fiscal authorities as to whether there is to be a monetary relaxation
to absorb some of the cost of the banking crash through the inflation tax. Under many if
not most circumstances  the answer will be no, but the point being made here is that
additional and unnecessary  problems will arise if the policy strategy of the fiscal and
monetary authorities are inconsistent, as they will be if the government is counting  on
partial inflation  tax financing.
Offset unintended effects of the restructuring  on monetary conditions
Second, (and subject to the first point) as a general proposition,  the monetary authorities
should not allow the bank financial restructuring  per se to affect aggregates that predict
the evolution of inflation (or of the other target variables of monetary policy). To the
extent that they are found to be affected by the restructuring,  the central bank will need to
take offsetting measures. An important distinction  here is that the restructuring is
focused on the affected banks, the monetary policy response is addressed to the
equilibrium of the system as a whole.
For instance, a restructuring that leaves certain  banks highly liquid (perhaps because  the
government has injected treasury bills) may result in a lowering of interbank interest
rates, or an expansion of aggregate domestic credit, or in a depreciation of the currency.
Any or all of these are likely to be among the most important indicators of monetary
policy stance in the economy, and the central bank will need to act to offset these
tendencies using the instruments available to it, which will vary depending  on the
development and sophistication  of the money markets, but which could include open
market sales, increasing the interest rate on standing  facilities, increasing reserve
requirements, or sales of foreign exchange into the market.
The point here is that the central bank needs to be vigilant so that it can take the needed
offsetting action. A simple policy framework  based on a model of demand and supply of
base money would clearly point to a need for the central bank to offset any changes in the
supply of base money that may have resulted from the restructuring, and this is the basic
message to keep in mind. 21  But the real world is more complex and the task is not
21 In a currency board system, the central bank's legal capacity to undertake such action will be limited.
This places more of the onus on the fiscal authority to ensure that it does not destabilize  monetary
conditions through the design of the restructuring. In this way the currency board system inhibits  the
separability of policy for which we have been arguing.
19straightforward. In particular, some standard  monetary policy indicators will have lost
their traditional reliability (cf. Martinez Peria, 2000)
This is especially  true of domestic credit. The financial restructuring will have resulted
in a write-down of the total stock of performing  credit. What is the "correct"  rate at
which credit should expand from the new low base? On the one hand the caution of
banks "once-bitten"  may lead to a continuing credit crunch driven by lack of lender
confidence. On the other hand, a rapid recovery  of credit aggregates to their former level
may result in macroeconomic  overheating.
Another example  is when deposits which have been frozen due to the bank failure are
released through the financial restructuring of the bank.  Whether or not this is reflected
in a jump in the measured money stock depends on the decision of statisticians  at the
time; but it may or may not be associated with an actual increase in spending that could
threaten monetary policy goals. This situation needs to be assessed  as it evolves.
There is no alternative  here to a having a very clear and unambiguous  definition of the
goals of monetary policy. Only then can policy measures  be adequately formulated and
adapted to ensure that these goals are being met.
If the focus of monetary policy is on inflation, or on maintaining the exchange rate, then
the central bank can devote its energies exclusively  to achieving that goal by being
prepared constantly to reevaluate and update the problematic causal linkages. After all,
nowadays this is the normal practice of central banks.
Accommodate confidence-based  shifts in money demand
A banking crisis is not just a question of accounting  adjustments. There can also be
strong shifts in depositor confidence. The classic example is Argentina in 1994-95,
where the banking system suffered a deposit outflow equivalent to about one-fifth of the
deposit base. 22 Once again the simple demand and supply of base money model suggest
that the central bank should accommodate  any shift in the demand for base money.
Where the goal of monetary policy is inflation  targeting this will be a useful starting point
for the practical implementation of policy. In a fixed exchange rate regime the capacity
of the central bank to deliver on this policy may be limited by its foreign exchange
reserves, and in a currency board system the central bank law will also impose
restrictions.
6.  Conclusions
Many issues that should remain separate tend to be lumped together in considering  how
to recapitalize banks. We have attempted to show how the issues concerning banking,
the budget and monetary stability can each be dealt with in a distinct manner.
22 For  a detailed  account  and  analysis  see d'Amato  et al. (1997).
20Before anything else is done, the government  must have a coherent medium-term fiscal
strategy that determines broadly how the costs of the banking crisis are going to be
absorbed. This is a pre-requisite.
After that, logically the first part to be got right is the banking aspect. The failed bank
must be securely reestablished with enough capital and franchise  value to move forward
as a normal bank. We have shown that this will typically entail new financial instruments
involving the government on both asset side and liability side of the bank's balance sheet.
The bank should not be left with maturity, currency or repricing mismatches.  Assets that
are injected should be bankable and preferably negotiable. The liability structure should
give the bank insiders the incentive  to manage the bank prudently.
The sophistication  and complexity of the financial instruments used can be considerable,
but only if the government has the credibility to warrant market confidence  that it will
deliver on the contracts without attempting  to use its law-making  powers to renege de
facto.  We have seen that innovative  use of segregated sinking funds and "Brady"-type
bonds can help where government credibility is weak.
In the event of a systemic crisis, a menu or schedular approach can be more effective in
bringing the private sector into play, and reducing the moral hazard and other drawbacks
of a discretionary approach.
The government will be interested in recovering some of its investment  as the bank
returns to profitability and the impaired loan portfolio is liquidated, but the financing and
investment  aspects of the transaction should  be kept distinct.
The restructuring of the bank will alter both the size and the maturity  and other
characteristics  of the government's  debt. Optimizing  these aspects should be done
separately, and with the market as a whole, rather than just with the affected  banks.
While restructuring should be a fiscal matter,  the central bank may often  become drawn
into it through inappropriate use of lender of last resort facilities. Accounting  for the
central bank's solvency support is rarely transparent, but should be.
The restructuring and the government's  fiscal response can have marked effects on
monetary stability. But these side-effects  need not normally be taken into account by the
supervisory/prudential  or fiscal authorities,  because ensuring that monetary conditions
remain on target is the task of the monetary authority, and one for which it normally has
enough systemic instruments at its disposal (though this may not be the case in a currency
board regime). For instance it needs to offset unintended effects on the aggregate  supply
of liquidity, while probably accommodating  shifts in liquidity demand.
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ANNEX 1: NOTES ON FIVE CONTRASTING CASES
Al  Attempting a Cash-free  Recapitalization:  Post-Tequila  MexicoI
The Tequila crisis of 1994-95  involved huge losses for Mexican banks leaving most of
the major banks undercapitalized  or insolvent, and an eventual  fiscal cost now projected
at almost 20 per cent of GDP.
The public vehicle used initially to alleviated  the resulting liquidity and solvency
problems was the existing Trust Fund for the Protection of Bank Savings (FOBAPROA),
although this was wholly underfunded  for the purpose (and also lacked adequate legal
powers). From 1999 a new "Institute for the Protection of Bank Savings" (IPAB) took
over the functions of bank resolution and of realizing the value of residual bank assets.
IPAB has also been charged with establishing a formal and limited deposit guarantee
scheme to replace the blanket deposit protection which had been implicit for years and
became explicit during the crisis - importantly extending even to interbank deposits.
Financial support  from Fobaproa
Fobaproa's financial support to the banking system camne  in a number of waves. The first
wave did not have a clear subsidy  element. These were a short-term dollar loan to meet
banks' immediate requirements  to repay foreign borrowings,  and a Temporary
Recapitalization Program (according  to which the Bank of Mexico  provided financing to
the banks, who in turn issued Fobaproa with subordinated  debentures). This wave was
soon superseded by a three-prong  program of bank intervention  supplemented  by a suite
of debtor support programs which had the intended effect of improving  the recoverability
of bank loans.
A. Capitalization and Loan Purchase Program (CLPP): For solvent  but undercapitalized
banks conditional on new capital from shareholders (initially  twelve banks
accounting for 84 per cent of the total banking system)
Fobaproa matched each $1 of capital injected by shareholders  with a purchase at face
value of the recoverable value on $2 of loans (banks retained  ownership and
administration of the loans and indemnified Fobaproa against 25% of the residual
losses 2).  Payment was with long-term (ten-year) non-negotiable  promissory notes
with interest accrued at market-related  rates (21 basis points below the Treasury
Certificate Cetes rate) but not paid until maturity. The total amount of Fobaproa
notes outstanding under this program at end-1999 was M$ 157 billion (US$1 is about
'This  note has benefited  from  conversations  with  Fernando  Montes-Negret,  and  draws  on World  Bank
Report No. P7347ME (November 1999). See also De Luna-Martinez  (2000).
2 Thus in effect, for each $100 face value of loans involved, Fobaproa was  promised 25+0.75r, where r is
the percentage recovery rate.Mexico
M$10); these were held by five banks (Banamex,  Bancomer, Banorte, BBV and Bital,
accounting between  them for almost 60 per cent of the system).
B.  Financial Strengthening  (Saneamiento)  Program: For banks seen as potentially
viable, but whose shareholders  would not put up new capital. (initially twelve
banks=12% of system).
Management  of these banks was taken over and they were downsized and financially
restructured. Again Fobaproa notes were injected into the banks' balance sheets to a
total value (to mid -1999) of almost M$ 200 billion; about half of these had a five-
year maturity with interest at about 100 basis points above the interbank rate TIIE
payable quarterly, a small portion were one-year  bullets and the remainder at ten-
years maturity (interest rate accruing at the Cetes rate but not paid until maturity).
This process remained incomplete and (as detailed  below) further injections in excess
of M$ 200 billion were envisaged for the seven banks remaining in this program.
C.  Liquidation (eight banks, including some which migrated  from Saneamiento status).
As part of the downsizing  of these banks, some branches  were sold to healthier banks
along with their liabilities  backed by Fobaproa-guaranteed  five-year interest-bearing
notes.  They also had interbank liabilities amounting  to about M$ 140 billion by end-
1999, extended under cover of the blanket deposit guarantee.
By mid-1999, the estimated  net fiscal cost of the financial support program (brought to
net present value terms) was estimated at M$ 873 billion, equivalent to 19.3 per cent of
GDP.  Of this amount, only about one-sixth (M$ 141 billion) had actually been paid over
by the fiscal authorities (mostly  through the controversial  and selective debtor support
programs), though a further  half or so were already recognized  in the form of Fobaproa
notes issued. At that stage, therefore, although the banking system's deposit liabilities
were guaranteed, many banks remained technically  insolvent and undercapitalized, and
even those which had been able to replace their impaired  loans with Fobaproa debt found
that this debt was neither negotiable  nor (in most cases) generating  any cash flow. It is
widely believed that this lack of financial autonomy was a main factor behind the
protracted decline in the real value of credit outstanding  during 1995-1999.
The IPAB initiative
It was against this background  that IPAB was established in 1999. Its plans are to move
rapidly to a resolution of 15 banks at present under intervention.
The two largest of these, Serfin and Bancremer, are the third and fourth largest banks 3 in
Mexico accounting for about 14 and 10 per cent of the system's liabilities respectively.
They are now in the process of being fully recapitalized  and will be sold. Existing equity
was written down to zero in both banks. IPAB acquired substantiallt all of the shares in
Serfin by injecting a one-year  bullet bond of M$ 21 billion, bringing to M$ 126 billion
3 After Banamex and Bancomer,  each with about 20 per cent. Other banks with more than about 5 per cent
of the market are Bital, with 9 per cent, and the foreign-owned  banks Bilbao  Vizcaya, Santander Mexicano
and Citibank, each with about 5-6 per cent.
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the total assistance projected  for Serfin's restructuring (Serfin's former owners had a right
to match Serfin's capital injection, but did not exercise  it).  Borrowing from the Bank of
Mexico, IPAB subscribed  Bancremer's new equity in an amount of M$ 102 billion.
The plan for three other banks which remained operational  though under intervention,
Atlantico, Promex and Inverlat, was that, following  further bond injections by IPAB,
each would be absorbed by a larger bank (respectively  Bital, Bancomer and Bank of
Nova Scotia). Two other small banks are also expected  to be sold.
The remaining eight small banks under intervention  are no longer dealing with the public
and are expected to be liquidated.
A particular concern for the future is to ensure that IPAB has the cash to meet the
obligations it has undertaken, and continues to undertake. As already noted, Fobaproa
had relied heavily on non-cash solutions and on non-negotiable  paper, but IPAB has
begun to inject shorter term bonds (as in the Serfin case), and will also have to assume
the interbank obligations of the banks being liquidated.  It is also hoped to convert some
of the longer-term non-negotiable  bullet notes into more liquid instruments.
Borrowing by IPAB in the market can generate cash, but these liabilities will in turn have
to be serviced. The deposit insurance premia, and projected  proceeds from asset sales
will not be enough, 4 and it is acknowledged that there will have to be budgetary transfers.
IPAB will also benefit from the proceeds of a World Bank Loan whose disbursement is
being made conditional inter alia on adequate IPAB borrowing and budgetary transfers to
IPAB
Remarks
Gradually, the essential elements of the Mexican  bank resolution begins to fall into place.
It is acknowledged by the authorities  that other banks remain under-capitalized relative to
strict Basel requirements, 5 and there will also have to be substantial new private
injections of equity capital if the system is to reach a 10 per cent risk-weighted capital
percentage on Basel definitions by 2003.
But the lengthy process undergone so far has revealed several of the pitfalls of financial
restructuring of banks, including lack of budgetary  transparency, insufficient authority
and funding for the agency charged with bank resolution,  the use of illiquid never-never
bonds contributing to a credit crunch, and prolonged  periods of unresolved intervention
of insolvent or undercapitalized  banks.
4 The projected recovery rate is only about 20 per cent.
5 The need to tighten bank accounting  definitions and practices, especially  in regard to items that can be
counted towards Tier I capital and in regard to required provisioning,  has long been recognized in Mexico
and has been in progress for some years now.
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A2  Recapitalizing  the Thai Banking System  1997-19996
The methods adopted to recapitalize the Thai banking system following the crisis of 1997
are of considerable  interest because of their diversity in the context of a fairly
sophisticated  financial system. After the initial intervention in 58 finance companies  in
May 1997,7  the Thai approach to resolving  the banking system problems was a gradualist
one, which is not yet fully accomplished.
The scale of the problem was very large, both for individual  banks, as a share of the total
banking assets, and in proportion to GDP. Overall  fiscal costs of the resolution have
been put at approximately  33 per cent of GDP.  First in line for assisting the failing
institutions was the Financial Institutions  Development  Fund, a distinct legal entity under
the Bank of Thailand (BOT), which borrowed  short-term from the BOT and from
stronger banks, to finance its lending to the weak. At June 1998, the government
announced its intention  to fund FIDF borrowings  with substantial foreign and domestic
borrowing (amounting eventually to $12.5 billion) at long-term. 8
With the volume of non-performing  loans growing  alarmingly to almost 50 per cent of
the total loan portfolio, 9 the Bank of Thailand  began (from March 1998) requiring  a more
detailed loan classification procedure with stated percentage provisioning  re  uirements
for normal, specially mentioned,  sub-standard,  doubtful and loss categories.1 The banks
were allowed until end-2000 to reach these required provisions (but had to reach one-fifth
by end-1998 and an additional one-fifth by the end of each subsequent semester). This
represented a considerable  degree of forbearance,  considering  how under-provisioned  the
banks were by early-1998.
The forbearance allowed a window for raising capital, during which banks which
considered their franchise  to be sufficiently  valuable did so. However, six small or
medium-sized banks were intervened on August 14, 1998, a key date when the authorities
(Bank of Thailand and Ministry of Finance  jointly) also announced  a general offer of
financial assistance to help recapitalize banks. This offer had two main elements.
- First, banks with insufficient  capital (i.e. which would have insufficient  primary
(Tier 1) capital when the full required provisions were taken) were eligible  for an
injection of tradable"  l ten-year fixed interest 12 government  bonds in return for non-
cumulative preference  shares in the bank. The rate of dividend was to be the same as
6 This note draws heavily on factual material in the EAP website.
7 Of which 56 were subsequently put into liquidation.
8 At the time, Minister of Finance Tarrin was reported as describing  the FIDF as "a monster that sucks
away most of the financial system's liquidity".
9 They peaked in May 1999 at Baht 2.7 trillion, or about $75 billion. The bulk of these non-performing
loans had by then migrated  to "loss" status.
10  The percentages are 1, 2, 10, 50 and 100, and applied to the amounts outstanding  net of collateral (to
which a "haircut" is applied.
"  But it was specified  that the Bank of Thailand  could not hold these bonds.
12 The interest rate fixed at 100  basis points below the one-year  (sic) deposit rate of the five largest Thai
banks current at the time of the transaction.Thailand
the dividend on common stock, or 100 basis points above that on the bond, which
ever was the lesser. The preference shares carried equal voting rights with common
stock, and were convertible to common stock at the holder's option. 13 (The full
amount of the required provisions had to be taken first, though, effectively writing-
down the existing shareholders'  capital.) The government was prepared to inject
enough funds to bring capital up to 2.5%. Thereafter  further injections  had to be
equally matched by an injection of funds by private shareholders.
- Second, banks were offered ten-year non-tradable  bonds in return for bank
debentures (which would count as Tier 2 capital). This scheme was designed to
encourage (i) debt forgiveness in corporate  restructuring involving  write-downs
beyond required provisioning and (ii) new lending. With the interest on debenture set
at 100 basis points above that on the bond, this scheme did not offer much if anything
in the way of net present value.
Setting aside the problems of non-bank finance houses,' 4 we can identify four distinct
major thrusts to the financial restructuring of the banks.' 5
- Intervention (6 banks: Bangkok Metropolitan  Bank, First Bangkok City Bank, Siam
City Bank, Bangkok Bank of Commerce  and two others).
These banks were deemed insolvent;  all had heavy indebtedness  to FIDF. They
were to be either liquidated, partly folded into State-owned  banks including the
large Krung Thai Bank, or restructured  (with FIDF swapping its debt claims for
equity) and sold.
- Seek government aid (Initially 3 banks: Siam Commercial, Thai Military and
Nakornthon; subsequently  others, through the "August 14" scheme -though take-
up of the government's "August 14"  menu has been much lower than budgeted.
In October 1999, the FIDF, which by then held 99 per cent of the capital, sold a
majority stake in Nakornthon, to Standard Chartered Bank; FIDF recovered more
than its initial injection in this transaction,  but it pledged to compensate  the new
shareholders  for a certain proportion  of the recovery shortfall on part of the loan
portfolio.
- Issue equity to strategic investors
Four major banks sold substantial shares to foreign partners:
13 They could also be sold by the government, but the other shareholders  had a right of first refusal.
14 A newly established Financial Sector Restructuring  Agency (FSRA) was established  to oversee the
liquidation or rehabilitation of these entities. The assets were auctioned off, with an eventual recovery rate
of only about 25%. An active purchaser here was the newly established state-owned  Asset Management
Company, described (by the Chair of the FSRA) as a "purchaser  of last resort". It is financed by
unguaranteed borrowing form the market.
"5  The relative size of different sources of Tier I recapitalization  by late 1999 is as follows:  (i) the
Government injected  approximately B 362 billion into six State-owned banks; (ii) Seven private banks
received B 38 billion through the Government's  "August 14" program, and B 282 billion from the market
(of which innovative instruments: about B 116b). By then, market observers believed that private banks
had raised about 85 per cent of the capital deficiency,  but state-owned banks had raised only about 40 per
cent of what would ultimately  be needed. (Source: EAP quarterly update, Dec 99)
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Bangkok Bank: 49%; Thai Farmers Bank (49% to Singapore  Development
Corporation); Thai Danu (majority acquired by Development  Bank of
Singapore); Bank of Asia (majority acquired by ABN Amro).
Sell special preferred-share-like  capital instruments
Three major banks (Bangkok  Bank, Thai Farmers Bank and Bank of Ayudhya)
raised substantial Tier 1 capital from public offerings of innovative  capital
instruments variously termed Stapled Limited Interest Preferred  Securities
(SLIPs) or Capital Augmented  Preferred Shares (CAPs). These are compound
securities which are partly eligible as Tier 1 capital (the preferred share element),
but also offer the investor a relatively high interest yield ranking as a subordinated
debenture. For instance, in one case the debenture interest was 11 per cent of the
total amount invested, with a further 11 per cent available from the preference
dividend, if paid. These were attractive  to local investors, including special
purpose unit trusts which were established to invest in such instruments.
In addition, some fiscal incentives  were offered for the creation of bank-specific  asset
management companies (AMCs) with the objective of isolating the process of
restructuring and realizing the bulk of a bank's bad debts. By early 2000, only one bank
(Thai Farmers) had established an AMC.
Remarks
Critics have complained about the slow progress in achieving  target recapitalization  and
in disposing of the non-performing  assets. Certainly the phase of capital forbearance  has
been a lengthy one.  Some of the initiatives  offered by the authorities  proved unattractive
to the market, given the alternative  of forbearance,  as a result, government  bonds placed
directly in the portfolio of failed banks represent a smaller portion of the solution here
than elsewhere (liquidity lending from the Bank of Thailand -- later funded by
government market borrowing at home and abroad, and subsequently  converted into
equity claims on the failed banks -- was the more important mechanism).
The quality qua-capital of the substantial funds that have been raised  with the new
innovative  capital instruments has been debated. Yet the system as it is emerging does
seem to have changed its character:  foreign ownership is quite extensive,  and the old
family structures have retreated into the background,  to the extent that they are present at
all.
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A3  Post-Tequila Bank Resolution  Approaches in Argentina
The liquidation of several Argentine  banks in the 1995 Tequila crisis highlighted gaps in
the legislative and institutional framework  for dealing with bank failure:  no explicit
deposit insurance, no way for the central bank to intervene and restructure a licensed
bank, no procedure or funding for government financial assistance to a restructured bank.
The three initiatives of early 1995 (for a detailed account see de la Torre, 2000, on which
this note draws heavily) addressed  these gaps. Subsequent bank restructurings  in
particular relied on financial engineering  involving the establishment  of a Deposit
Insurance Company (SEDESA) and Fund (FGD) - which rely for funding wholly on
levies made on the banks - and the state-backed  Bank Capitalization  Trust Fund (FFCB)
- which pitches in supplementary  resources, and has been seen as a temporary entity (it
was to be wound-up in February 2000).
In most of the nineteen bank resolutions  from mid-  1995 to mid-  1999  (documented by de
la Torre), the bulk of the assets and liabilities (including all of the deposits - and not just
insured deposits) of the failing were acquired by other banks, together with a topping-up
of resources from the FGD and/or  the FFCB.1 6 In just three cases, the transfer of
deposits to the acquiring banks was only partial.
Total assistance amounted to $ 0.7 billion from FGD and $ 0.4 billion from FFCB, for a
total of $1.1 billion - about 0.3 per cent of GDP, but between 1 and 2 per cent of M2.
(Note that this does not include the deficiency of provincial and other banks that failed in
the early stages of the Tequila crisis).
For one recent case (Almafuerte  Bank), an innovative approach was adopted to the
handling of the impaired loan portfolio. Instead of transferring ownership  of this
portfolio to the acquiring banks, along with additional cash and perhaps put-back options,
the portfolio was securitized through a trust structure. Three tranches  were created, with
the acquiring banks'7 receiving  the top (senior) tranche, the central  bank accepting the
second tranche in return for collateral it held against liquidity loans that had been made to
the failing bank, and the remaining  (junior) tranche going to the FGD in return for its
promissory note to the acquiring bank for the difference between  the value of the deposits
transferred and the value of their (top tranche) bonds. The portfolio itself was managed
by the acquiring banks for a fee.
The advantages seen for this approach  included (i) the speed with which it could be
accomplished  (over a weekend), without  a lengthy process of asset evaluation during
which the bank would, like others, have had to remain closed; and (ii) access for the
acquirer to potentially liquid securities  even though neither the FGD nor the central bank
16 The FFCB's assistance was in the form of long-term loans either on a collateralized  basis, or convertible
into negotiable  instruments.  It was funded by budgetary transfers which were in turn covered by a special
government bond issue, and by earmnarked  loans from multilateral agencies.
17 In this, as in other cases, there were many acquiring banks, with the assignment  of the failing banks
assets and liabilities being based on geographical  considerations.Argentina
had any cash to put in.  1 8 There are also a number of drawbacks. The FGD absorbs the
residual loss, but has little control over the loan recovery  process; although it determined
that this would be a lower cost approach than liquidating  and paying-off insured
depositors, it would be extremely  hard for such a determination  to be made with any
confidence, especially given  the speed with the transaction  was accomplished.
The securitization approach nevertheless  represents an example of how innovative
financial engineering can overcome some of the obstacles to speedy and effective
restructuring of the banking system. Going forward, the acquiring  banks have obtained
liquidity and certainty; they also obtained the franchise  value of the ongoing business at
no cost.
These features could be built upon for future cases:
- while the FGD is here the bearer of the residual risk, it could be possible to sell this
risk to a risk-accepting  investment  fund at the time of the initial transaction.
- the loan recovery process could be endowed with better incentive characteristics.
- some of the franchise value might be realized in the initial deal for the benefit of the
FGD.
IS The FGD because its cash resources  have been depleted, the central bank because of the convertibility
plan/currency board rules.
8A4  The use of bonds in recapitalization  of Bulgarian banks' 9
Dominated by the state-owned  Bulbank (heavily involved in foreign trade finance) and
the State-Savings Bank (SSB), the Bulgarian banking system in the early 1990s  also
comprised several other medium-sized  state-owned  banks and an emerging fringe of
private banks. During the following  several years, the system suffered two waves of
severe collapse. The first of these was resolved through the injection of government
bonds into the affected state-owned  banks. Bonds were also used in the second phase,
though here the real value of the deposit liabilities was substantially  wiped-out by
inflation and currency collapse. By the end of the decade the surviving banks were being
prepared for privatization,  or had already been privatized, including the arrival of foreign
owners for several significant  institutions.
The first  wave - Zunks
Already in the early 1990s,  following  the collapse of the planned economy, the
Government had to act to recapitalize  state-owned banks by substituting,  for
unrecoverable loans to insolvent state-owned  enterprises, its own long-term bonds in the
balance sheet of certain state-owned  banks.
In this first wave 20, two issues  of 25-year "Zunk" bonds were made, one in local currency
and the other in US dollars in late 1993-early 1994. These were used to recapitalize
certain state-owned banks by being substituted for unrecoverable  loans to insolvent state-
owned enterprises.21
The Zunk bonds were to be repaid in 20 equal annual instalments  after a five-year grace
period; the US dollar issue, of which $680.5 million remained  outstanding at end-
April1999, carries LIBOR interest (paid semi-annually);  the BGL issue, of which (new-
style) BGL 8.8 million remains  outstanding pays a semi-annual  interest rate rising to the
"Basic interest rate" (yield on new bill issues); for 1999,  the interest is at two-thirds of the
basic interest rate. Also in the first wave were some additional local currency bonds, not
called Zunk, with initial maturities  varying from 7 to 25 years. 22
The bonds carry below-market  interest: the BGL Zunk issue at present pays two-thirds
the local interbank rate, and although the dollar issue pays LIBOR, one has to recognize
that Bulgarian govenment dollar-denominated  debt yields much more than LIBOR. As
such, these bonds have never been marketable at par.  The prices have fallen as low as 42
per cent of par (April 1997),  and recent prices (April 1999)  have been in the mid-SOs.
Valuing them in the banks' balance sheet at par is a rather dubious practice.
19 This note benefited from useful discussions  with Esen Ulgenerk and Leila Zlaoui.
20 There was additionally an earlier limited transformation  of bank claims on State-owned enterprises into
public debt in 1991.
21 All loans extended to State-owned  enterprises before end-l 990 and in arrears of more than 180 days were
replaced with government securities.
22 The total amount of these additional  first-wave bonds is B3GL  16.0  million. Most of these carry either the
local interbank rate, or 100 basis points more.Bulgaria
Until early 1997, there was a floor (-90) on the price used in transactions involving
Zunks.  Nevertheless,  the fact that Zunks' market value is lower has been implicitly  or
explicitly recognized  in some of the special operations  that have subsequently  been
carried out involving Zunks and banks:
(i)  $824 million of Zunks owned by the (medium-sized)  Mineral and Economic
banks were converted at or close to par in May 1995 into short-term lev-
denominated  securities at market rate and used to extinguish the debts of these
banks to the Central Bank (BNB) and the SSB.
(ii)  Seven state-owned  banks were recapitalized in May 1996 in a scheme involving
Zunks. Zunks with a face value of $400 million were bought from Bulbank  by
the State Fund for Reconstruction and Development  (SFRD), for $180 million
(representing  a 55% discount). Most of the proceeds of this were placed on
deposit by Bulbank  at the BNB (to prevent depletion  of official reserves). The
Zunks were given without any consideration  (i.e.  payment) from SFRD to the
Bank Consolidation  Company (BCC), which in turn transferred them to
individual state-owned  banks to increase their capital as needed.
(iii)  BNB made outright  purchases of Zunks in September 1996  to provide liquidity  to
banks in difficulty  (Note this is only a small part of the liquidity extended by
BNB in this crisis year).
Zunks are tradable. Under certain conditions they are accepted at par in purchase of
some of the state assets being privatized. Over two-thirds (approximately BGL 20
million) of the local currency Zunks and rather less than a quarter (about $200 million) of
the dollar Zunks has been cashed-in in for privatization.
The holders at end-April 1999 of US dollar denominated  Zunks were Government-owned
banks (30%), local private banks (2  1%), local nonbank  financial institutions, companies
and households (399%)  and foreign investors (11%).
The second wave
The crisis of 1996-97  triggered a second wave of fiscal impact from the banking sector.
The defacto  liberalization  of bank entry after 1989 had seen the emergence of dozens of
banks, many of which had been operated in an unsound  manner, to say the least. (In
addition, unregulated  quasi-banks attracted significant  sums from naive savers in the
same period). Some of the large state-owned banks also made imprudent loans in the
early 1990s, including interbank loans to unsound  institutions. The banking and currency
crisis of 1996-97 was marked by depositor runs on many of the banks and on the
currency. By February 1997, the BGL had collapsed  to 2.387 to the dollar, from 0.081
just ten months before. Although it recovered to 1.546  in April 1997, this was still one-
twentieth of its dollar value of a year prior.
During this crisis seventeen  banks, including the largest private bank (First Private 23),
were closed and placed in liquidation. 24 During the crisis the government introduced  a
23 Then  comparable  in size  to the third  largest  public  bank  (UBB).
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deposit guarantee, at first rather limited, but then extended to cover all household
deposits in full, and enterprise deposits as to 50 per cent. These covered deposit
liabilities were transferred to continuing banks, and matched in these banks accounts by
newly created special Government securities. 25 The total of these new stocks issued 1996-
99 amounted to over 2 per cent of GDP (significant  additional quasi-subsidies  were
provided to recapitalize  the banking system during 1996).26
Despite the compensation,  and despite high deposit  interest rates prevailing throughout,
depositors lost heavily in real terms through the 1996-97  crisis. The US dollar value of a
BGL time deposit, including accumulated  interest, declined during the crisis to about
one-tenth of its initial value, before recovering  to less than one-sixth by the end of the
crisis. Thus, appreciable though it was, the fiscal cost of 1996-97 crisis was only a
fraction of the depositor  loss. Furthernore, the Government  remains a creditor in the
liquidation of the closed banks, standing in the place of the compensated  depositors, and
will recover some fraction of its outlay.
Remarks
The realization of large capital gains and losses as a result of massive currency
depreciation, the ambiguity of valuing non-tradable  government bonds where there is a
high default premium on sovereign debt and the lack of transparency of mandatory
transactions in Zunk bonds at false prices between state-owned  entities are among  the
less attractive features of the financial engineering  surrounding  the Bulgarian
recapitalizations. They illustrate some of the pitfalls as well as the temptations of the use
of financial engineering. On the other hand there were positive features: some attempt
24 In mid-1997,  the government  moved to liquidate some  150 SOEs and to place  71 others  in an
"isolation"  program  preventing  their access  to further  bank  credit  while  they  were  being
rehabilitated,  privatized  or liquidated.  The isolation  program  was  due to end at mid-1999.
25 The  new securities  are tradable  only  between  banks,  but  have  a shorter  maturity  than  the Zunks  - seven
years for BGL-denominated  and three years for US dollar denominated. They carry a floating yield
equivalent to the Bulgarian "basic  rate" (auction rate at the weekly primary  auction of Treasury  bills), or at
LIBOR+2 for the US dollar denominated issues). The first such securities were redeemed in mid-June
1999, partly in cash, and partly with new issues, including some denominated  in euro.
26 It has been estimated by the IMF that, in the past decade,  Government bail-outs of the banking system
have added 35 percentage points to the public debt to GDP ratio, although by 1998,  the aggregate  value of
these bonds (the largest part of which are the US$-denominated  "Zunk" bonds) had been reduced  through
inflation and the use of bonds in privatization  to about 7 per cent of GDP.
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was continuously  made to maintain  some degree  of positive capitalization  in the banking
system in the face of adverse  circurnstances,  and the introduction  of Zunk bonds did help
begin to establish  a local bond market.  Starting  now from a much smaller base, with a
solid currency  regime (a currency  board using a DM/euro  peg) and with profit-driven
private ownership free from political pressures  to depart from principles of prudent
banking,  the third new start for the Bulgarian  banking  system will hopefully  be more
successful and enduring  than the previous  two.
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A5  Cameroon - enhancing government  credibility
As in most other CFA countries, the largest banks in Cameroon until the late 1  980s were
the affiliates of the four French-based  banking  groups with an interest in the region:
Credit Lyonnais (SCB), Banque Intemationale  de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (the former
colonial bank of issue) (BIAOC), and consortia  headed by Societe Generale (SGBC) and
by Banque Nationale de Paris (BICIC). Between  them these four accounted for some
three quarters of bank credit. Varying through this period, about eight to ten other banks
were also present, of which the largest were the affiliates of the (now notorious) BCCI, of
Paribas, and of the Zambian-based Meridien  group, the national development  bank BCD
(which did accept deposits) and Cambank,  based in the English-speaking  region.
Already by 1988 serious problems were evident, with tight liquidity inhibiting  routine
deposit withdrawals from most banks, and with four banks having closed their doors.
Interestingly,  each of the four major regions of the country (the coast, the English-
speaking uplands, the Yaounde area and the North) represented the main area of activity
of one of these four early failures (SCB, BCD, Paribas and Cambank). Considerable
deposits were lost or frozen. The CFA 200 million in claims of the BCEAO  on these
banks were assumed by the government and consolidated  at concessional  rates (3 per cent
per annum over 15 years with an initial grace period).
Analysis of the delinquent loan portfolio of the early bank failures suggested no specific
concentration of bad borrowers (over 40,000 small loans were bad), but a generally
insouciant attitude to credit discipline,  and loans granted without sufficient  regard to the
issue of repayment. Admittedly,  the economic  downturn associated with export product
price declines had already begun, but the problem of government arrears  had not yet
mushroomed to the level it subsequently  reached.
The intemational collapse of the BIAO group during 1990, of BCCI in 1992 and of the
Meridien group27  in 1995 were only part of the worsening extemal and intemal situation
through the early 1  990s, which led to a drastic curtailment of liquidity so that depositors
were able to access their deposits either not at all, or with varying degrees of ease.
Public enterprises and bodies failed to service their loans, government arrears to suppliers
and employees had a knock-on effect on their loan servicing also. 28 Using the vehicle of
a debt recovery agency Societe de Recouvrement  des Creances (SRC),  much of the non-
performing portfolios were replaced by government  obligations in a successive  rounds of
restructuring. (The SRC was not at first conspicuously  successful in recovery: by mid-
1994 it had recovered only 3 per cent of sums with face value of CFA 640 billion which
had been transferred to it) 29. The foreign partners also injected capital, sometimes using
debt-equity swaps in the international  secondary  market for Cameroon  debt as a low-cost
27Which  had added some of the BIAOC's balance sheet  to its own pre-existing  Cameroon  operations in
1991.
28At October 1995, Government arrears to the Commercial  banks were estimated at CFA 200 billion, out of
total Government arrears of CFA 1300 billion, or about 30 per cent of GDP. In 1993,  Cameroon  GDP was
about CFA3300 billion.  Until  early 1994,CFA50=FRFI; thereafter CFAIOO=FRFI.
29 Note however that less than half of the 640 represented loans;  the remainder included  suspense accounts
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way of doing so. But the government  was unwilling to allow the staff layoffs that would
have been necessary to bring the banks' finances back on an even keel, and most of the
banks slipped back into illiquidity and insolvency.  Under these circumstances  BNP,
which had held a 36 per cent share of BICIC -then the largest bank - ceded its shares to
the Governrment  and pulled out in September 1994,  after which BICIC suffered deposit
runs and eventually failed.
By that stage, although the devaluation  had resulted in a reflow of funds that greatly
eased bank liquidity, only two banks were considered solvent  and were trading
profitably: the small private bank CCEI, and the restructured SCB  (now called SCB-CL),
which had been recapitalized on terms very advantageous  to Credit Lyonnais.  The
problem was not only failure of the government to pay promptly on its own indebtedness
(some of it assumed as part of restructuring  as mentioned,  but also the high share of non-
performing loans to private borrowers  -varying between 39 per cent and 61 per cent at
four of the larger banks. In 1995,  a new round of restructuring began,  designed to place
the surviving banks on a firm financial  basis with adequate  capitalization. A further
tranche of bad assets was carved out and passed to the SRC, replaced  with government
obligations.
In terms of loss allocation, three contrasting approaches  were employed in different
cases: (a) absorption of past losses by existing shareholders  at the prorata of their
participation in the capital and recapitalization  by the private partner (Societe Generale,
Standard Chartered); (b) split of a failed bank into a healthy one and a liquidation
structure (BICIC/BICEC);  and (c) outright liquidation of banks with losses to depositors,
who are reimbursed out of loan recoveries with preference given  to small depositors,
(Credit Agricole, Meridien bank).
In response to a perception that institutional  strengthening was needed, the governance
structure of the SRC has been reformed. Under the new structure,  40% of Board
members are from the private sector and the general manager 30 and his deputy are
appointed by the Board (requires  a two-third  majority). Recoveries  increased to 18
billion in fiscal 1998 and 16 billion in fiscal 1999. In a further  policy reform delinquent
borrowers are forbidden by a Ministry of Finance regulation to obtain further  bank credit
or to participate in bids for public procurement  and privatizations.
Against a history of government  arrears, an important initiative  in 1998-99  was the
securitization  of claims by four banks on the Cameroon state totalling CFA 164 billion
(arising out of the restructuring). 3'  One half of these claims were converted into bonds
with maturities from 4'/2  to 12 years;  the other half into bonds with a maturity of 30 years.
All of the bonds carry a variable  interest rate equal to the banks' cost of funds plus 1.25%.
The first tranche is secured  by an escrow account (compte sequestre)  at the BEAC into
which are deposited certain earmarked  fiscal receipts. The remainder  is backed by a 30-
30 An expatriate adviser to the general manager specializing in loan recovery has been appointed.
3' The banks were: BICEC (established  in 1997  to take over assets and liabilities  of the failed BICIC);
SBC-CLC; SGBC; and SCBC.
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year zero-coupon bond of the Government of France which was acquired and pledged by
the Government of Cameroon in early 1999.
The long-drawn-out  Cameroon banking crisis has had complex causes and easy solutions
are not at hand. By applying standard  financial engineering devices  for credit-
enhancement in a somewhat  unusual setting, the recent securitization  of the restructured
banks' claims on the govermment  offers some prospect of making these securities
bankable. In this way, there may be some prospect of overcoming  the perennial problem
of government arrears that has plagued banking in this part of the world.
Indeed, observers now report that the Cameroon banking system restructuring  is being
seen as a conspicuous success,  with all large banks solvent (several  with more than 8 per
cent capital even on an unweighted  basis), liquid and profitable. With the privatization of
BICEC, all banks are now privately-owned,  and there has been new entry with the arrival
of Citibank and Ecobank, as well as two locally-owned  banks.
15ANNEX 2:  KEY ELEMENTS OF THE BASEL DEFINITION  OF CAPITAL 32
Core (Tier 1) capital includes:
Onlypermanent shareholders' equity (issued and fully paid ordinary shares/common
stock and perpetual non-cumulative  preference shares) and disclosed  reserves (created or
increased by disclosed appropriations  of post-tax retained  earnings  or other surplus, and
available to meet (through the profit and loss account) losses  for unrestricted and
immediate  use as soon as they occur.
Liability side items which can be included in supplementary  (Tier 2) capital
Revaluation reserves
(a) from a formal revaluation of banks' own premises to reflect something closer to their
current value than historic cost, carried through to the balance  sheets; or
(b) from a notional addition to capital of hidden values which arise from the practice of
holding securities in the balance sheet valued at historic costs. These "latent"
revaluation reserves can be included, provided they are subject  to a substantial
discount (of 55% on the difference  between the historic cost book value and market
value) in order to reflect concerns both about market volatility and about the tax
charge which would arise were such cases to be realised.
General  provisions/general loan-loss reserves
General provisions or general loan-loss reserves, created against  the possibility of losses
not yet identified, where they are not ascribed to particular assets and do not reflect a
reduction in the valuation of particular assets. (Where, however, provisions have been
created against identified losses  or in respect of a demonstrable  deterioration in the value
of particular assets, they are not freely available to meet unidentified  losses which may
subsequently arise elsewhere in the portfolio and do not possess  an essential
characteristic of capital.) Such items would constitute no more than 1.25 percentage
points, or exceptionally and temporarily  up to 2.0 percentage  points, of risk assets within
the secondary elements.
Hybrid debt capital instruments
In this category fall a number of capital instruments which combine certain
characteristics  of equity and certain characteristics  of debt, but are able to support losses
on an on-going basis without  triggering liquidation. They should also be unsecured,
subordinated and  fully paid-up; not redeemable without  regulatory approval; available to
participate in losses without the bank being obliged to cease trading (unlike conventional
subordinated  debt); and should allow service obligations lo be deferred  where the
profitability of the bank would not support payment.
32 Abstracted from the Basel Committee  documents.Cameroon
Subordinated term debt
Subordinated term debt instruments with a minimum original term to maturity of over
five years, but only to a maximum  of 50% of the core capital element and subject to 20%
amortisation per annum in the last five years.
Required deductions from assets before calculation of capital
(i)  Goodwill, as a deduction from tier 1 capital elements;
(ii)  Unconsolidated investments  in subsidiaries  engaged in banking and financial
activities.
17ANNEX 3: ILLUSTRATIVE  BALANCE  SHEETS  DURING A
RECAPITALIZATION
In this Annex, we work through a simple balance sheet of a bank being constructed from
some of the assets and liabilities  of a failed bank. We start from the position where the
asset portfolio has been cleaned up and revalued, and the amount of deposits to be kept
on the books has been decided. In other words, Any of the non-performning  advances and
depositor claims that are not going to be left on the balance sheet of the bank going
forward have now been removed, and the entity awaits its capital injection.
For this example, we take a general-purpose  classification  representing the bank's balance
sheet in simplified form as: A+B=C+D  where  A is advances,  B is securities (Bills and
Bonds), C is capital and D the deposits that are to be honored by the recapitalized bank.
(Table 1). B may be subdivided  into BS (short-term,  bills) and BL (long-term, bonds)
(Table 2).
Table 1: Simplified balance  sheet structure
Assets  Liabilities
Securities (B)  Deposits (D)
Advances (A)  Capital items (C)
Table 2: Slightly amplified balance sheet
Assets  Liabilities
Liquid Assets (BS)  Deposits (D)
Investments (BL)  Govt. capital claims (C&)
Advances (A)  Shareholder's  funds (Ce)
As with any balance sheet, it is important to be aware of the conventions  that are being
followed. For our simplified  analytical view, it is most useful to use the following
conventions (which are not too far from those followed  by best practice under IAS:
Take B to be valued at current market value since, at the time of recapitalization,
the current market value of marketable securities  is known.
The deposits D can be valued at par, considering  that they are to be honored.
There is some uncertainty  about the net recoverable  value of the advances,  even if
some of the worst performing ones have been removed before the recapitalization.
Nevertheless, an expected  value of the net recoverable value A can be calculated.
This approach allows the value of capital to be deduced as a residual:
C=A+B-D.
Note that this accounting  approach does not give any credit for the franchise value of the
bank's business. As such the true value of all the non-deposit  claims may be higher than
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The minimum capital requirement is, however, based on accounting  capital and can be
written:
C2yA
Now consider the situation  just before the injection of capital. Identifying this initial
(pre-recapitalization)  values by a subscript 0, the initial capital deficiency (relative to the
regulatory minimum of capital is yA 0 - C 0 . Suppose  now that the government and new
shareholders inject additional securities AeBG  and ABP. Then, if post-injection values are
denoted by subscript l, we have B, 1 Bo+ABG  +ABP,  and C,=CO+  ABG  +ABP.  Sufficient
capital has been injected if:
ABG  + ABP > YAo  _  Co.
The new capital stock C 1 = A + B 1 - D can be divided into capital-type claims by
government CG  (for example  in the form of preferred shares or other subordinated  claims
as discussed in the text), and those of the private shareholders  Cp. In order to induce
investment by private shareholders,  it is unlikely that CG  can be set much higher than
ABG  Co.  In words, the govemment will only be able to get a share in the bank's capital
to the extent that it injects bonds to a value greater than the initial negative net worth of
the bank. The design of the government's claim can be such as to give the government an
important share of any subsequent  revision in the estimated recovery value of advances
A.
Table 3: Illustrative  Numerical  Example
(a)  pre-recapitalization
Assets  Liabilities
BSo  0  D  100
BLo 0  CG  0
A 0 80  Cpo (residual)  -20
(b) Immediate  post-recapitalization
Assets  Liabilities
BSi  6  D  100
BLi  23  CG  3
A1 80  Cp" (residual)  6
(c) New equilibrium
Assets  Liabilities
BS2 12  D  100
BL 2 0  CG 2 3
A2 97  CP 2 (residual)  6
After the injection of marketable  funds, the bank's management will adjust the structure
of its portfolio based on the objective of maximizing franchise value. This will typically
involve an increase in the lending portfolio, where there is greater franchise value than in
the portfolio of securities;  and the securities portfolio will move to a shorter maturity
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consistent with its function of retaining a liquidity  cushion. Thus there may be an
increase both in BS/BL and in A/B. Another  way of thinking of this is to observe  that, to
the extent that the bonds are being injected  to compensate  for a write-down in A, it is
likely that the ratio A 1/B 1 is below the desired  level. Therefore the final structure  of the
bank's portfolio will involve sale of bonds and expansion  of advances. It is this
adjustment that monetary policy action may need to offset.
Table 3 illustrates  the kind of structures  we have been describing. Pre-recapitalization  we
have a bank with net recoverable advances of only 80, and deposits of 100. Thus by
subtraction we deduce that accounting capital is negative 20. Government then injects
bonds to the value of 23 and new private shareholders  inject cash of 6. This gives us the
second panel "immediate  post recapitalization",  where we have assumed that the
government takes a long-term capital claim worth (expected net present value) 3. The
accounting value of shareholders' funds is then deduced by subtraction to be 6, which
happens to be the same as the value of the cash they injected. However,  this is not really
just a zero-sum game for the private shareholders:  they will receive an additional  stream
of profits in future from the franchise value of the bank. In the third panel, we see that
the bank has decided to sell the (long-term)  bonds received, partly to increase liquidity,
and partly to expand lending. Note also that the new lending amount of 97 is backed by a
total of 9 in capital - giving a capital ratio of just above 9 per cent.
Finally we should note that the cost of the bailout to the government in the numerical
example here is 20: being the injection of bonds less the capital claim acquired. This is
an expected net present value calculation. Over the coming years, the government  will
pay interest on the bonds, and receive dividends  on the capital claim. This flow of net
payments is another way of summarizing  the cost of the bailout. Either the net present
value, or the flow calculation,  can be used. But not both, as that would obviously  be
double-counting.
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